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CEO Succession, Gender, and Risk-Taking 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine, within a succession framework, the impact of 
the gender composition of Boards of Directors on the gender of the CEOs they appoint, and to 
assess the impact of newly appointed CEOs’ gender on risk-taking by the firm. 
 
Design/methodology - We estimate a two stage least squares regression using data on 679 CEO 
successions in North American firms.  
 
Findings - The results show that successor CEOs are more likely to be female the greater the 
percentage of females on the Board, regardless of other succession characteristics such as 
whether the new CEO is from inside or outside the firm.  Furthermore, a change in CEO from 
male to female is associated with a decrease in several measures of firm risk taking. 
 
Limitations – The sample is restricted to relatively large, exchange-traded North American 
firms and may not generalize to other groups.   
 
Practical Implications – The findings suggest that women aspiring to CEO positions and firms 
wishing to promote women should monitor Board composition to ensure female representation. 
Other steps that the firm may take to promote women to this position (such as looking outside 
the firm) have an insignificant impact when Board composition is taken into account. 
 
Originality/value – The findings are novel and inform CEO succession research by 
demonstrating which succession process characteristics work to increase females’ chances and 
which have no effect.  Female CEOs are likely to provide leadership that reduces the risk profile 
of the firm. 
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CEO Succession, Gender, and Risk-Taking 
 
   
Women comprise a disproportionately small percentage of CEO positions (Brady et al., 
2011; Orser and Leck, 2010; Hansen et al., 2010). Although one may debate appropriate 
definitions of career success (Orser and Leck, 2010; O’Leary, 1997), we instead use a CEO-
succession framework to investigate factors that may help women succeed men as corporate 
CEOs.  We also address the question of risk-taking by female CEOs.  The relation between 
gender and risk-taking is an empirical issue, but the two have often been thought of as linked 
(Sheaffer et al., 2011; Maxfield et al., 2010; Beckmann and Menkoff, 2008).  Some of these 
studies involve risk taking as revealed by questionnaires, simulations or experiments (Maxfield 
et al., 2010).  Studies using these approaches leave unanswered the question of whether male or 
female CEOs take on more risk in actual corporations. In addition, there are studies of actual risk 
taking in allocation of pension funds (Bajtelsmit et al., 1999), and gambling, investment and 
insurance decisions (Barber and Odean, 2001; Schubert et al., 1999).  These studies find women 
more risk averse and/or less overconfident than men. However, Bliss and Potter (2002) find 
female mutual fund managers take on marginally more risk and Atkinson et al. (2003) find no 
significant difference in risks of male and female managed mutual funds. Beckmann and 
Menkhoff (2008) find female fund managers slightly more risk averse.  Welsch and Young 
(1984) find no difference between male and female entrepreneurs and Iqbal et al. (2006) find 
male executives more risk averse than females in their handling of stock option awards. In short, 
the findings on gender and risk-taking are mixed. Adams et al. (2009) show that women are 
appointed to CEO positions when the firm is in a relatively good financial state, but they do not 
examine whether the new female CEOs take steps to change the risk profile of the firm after 
 3 
appointment. In this paper we examine how the risk profile of the firm changes after appointment 
of the new CEO. The risk measure in Adams et al. (2009) is risk as perceived by the stock 
market. We instead look at risk in terms of measures over which the new CEO has more control. 
Often risk taking is viewed positively (Tucker, 2006; Kleiman, 1992). However, in the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, excessive risk-taking has received much blame and risk 
aversion is viewed more favourably (Power, 2009; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009; 
Mortgenson, 2008; Syed, 2008). CEO successions provide the ideal opportunity to identify the 
impact of gender on risk-taking in corporations by examining actual corporate outcomes when 
the gender of the CEO changes through succession. 
In summary, this paper addresses the need identified by Brady et al. (2011, p. 85) “for 
further research on how organizational characteristics and processes influence the presence of 
female executives in large corporations.”  This article addresses that need by employing a CEO-
succession framework and provides outcome-based evidence on female CEOs’ impact on 
corporate risk-taking. 
 
The CEO Succession framework 
There is a substantial body of literature regarding CEO succession beginning with Zajac 
and Westphal (1996) (Elsaid and Davidson, 2009; Davidson et al., 2008; Worrell et al., 1997). In 
this literature, two main types of explanatory variables are used to model the CEO succession 
process with regression analysis.  One group of explanatory variables relates to the similarity of 
the CEO candidates to the members of the Board of Directors. This approach is derived from 
Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. Under this theory, the 
Board of Directors is a group that may display in-group bias by giving preferential treatment to 
 4 
those they perceive as similar.  If the Board is comprised mainly of men, they will prefer a male 
as the successor CEO. Furthermore, under social identity theory, leaders are close to the 
prototypical group member.  If the group (Board) is mostly male, they will view another male as 
the most suitable to play a leadership (successor CEO) role. Zajac and Westphal (1996) find that 
boards appoint a demographically similar CEO. The demographic similarity measures that Zajac 
and Westphal (1996) investigate are age, functional background, and educational background. 
For our study of gender and CEO succession, we redefine the usual dependent variable of 
succession studies to indicate whether a change in gender of the CEO occurs upon succession, 
and include as a demographic similarity explanatory variable a measure of the gender makeup of 
the Board of Directors. Matsa and Miller (2011) examine whether the presence of women on the 
Boards leads to the appointment of more women in senior management positions in the firm. By 
using a succession framework, we are able to incorporate additional factors and see if, for 
example, recruiting outside the firm increases the chance of a female being hired as CEO given a 
certain percentage of women on the board.  
Other models also suggest groups such as Boards of Directors will hire candidates similar 
to themselves.  For example, there has been considerable previous research on the concept of 
similarity-attraction that covers both the management and organizational behaviour literature 
(e.g., Goldberg, 2005; Smith, 1998; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989) and the psychology literature (e.g., 
Moreno & Flowerday, 2006; Michinov & Monteil, 2002; Jackson et al., 1991). Schneider (1987) 
developed the attraction-selection-attrition model which suggests that firms evolved towards 
interpersonal homogeneity. Ployhart et al. (2006) support a multilevel interpretation of the 
attraction-selection-attrition model. Pfeffer (1983) developed the organizational demography 
model which suggests that the firm’s demographic composition such as gender, age, religion and 
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socioeconomic position influences not only individual behaviour but also the actions of the firm. 
Both the attraction-selection-attrition and the organizational demography models indicate that 
people are attracted to firms whose members are like them, and, likewise, firms seek to attract 
similar members and screen out dissimilar people. Harrison et al. (1998) define social integration 
as “the degree to which group members are psychologically linked ....with one another in pursuit 
of a common objective.” They find that surface diversity is important in CEO succession since 
the hiring of a CEO by a board is often the beginning of the relationship between the CEO and 
the board. 
Beyond similarity of CEO candidates to members of the Board, the other explanatory 
variables used in the CEO succession literature comprise variables which have been 
demonstrated to be significant to CEO choice in prior empirical studies.  Examples include the 
profitability of the firm (Carter et al., 2003), the possible existence of a “designated heir” CEO 
(when the firm has a succession plan) (Shen and Cannella, 2003), the choice between inside 
versus outside successors (Naveen, 2006), and whether the succession is forced or voluntary 
(Parrino, 1997).  
In addition to the question of demographic similarity in CEO successions, we also 
investigate the impact of successor CEO demographics on corporate risk taking. CEO 
successions offer a unique opportunity to study the impact of CEO characteristics on risk-taking, 
because most characteristics related to risk, such as the riskiness of the firm’s operations, the 
competitive situation, and the firm size all remain fixed around the CEO succession and the only 
major change is in who is filling the CEO position. 
 In summary, we draw on the literature on similarity-attraction and organizational 
demography to develop a hypothesis regarding the importance of women on the board to 
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selecting a female CEO. We also draw on the literature on gender and risk taking to develop a 
hypothesis about how newly appointed female CEOs might alter the risk profile of the firm. 
 
Methods 
 
 As in previous CEO succession studies, we use regression analysis. Based on the 
similarity-attraction and organizational demography literature and Matsa and Miller (2011), we 
propose: 
   
Hypothesis 1: Changes in CEO gender from male to female arising from succession are a 
positive function of the change in the percentage of females on the board (and vice 
versa).      
   
 Although results on gender and risk taking were mixed, the majority of the studies noted 
in the literature review (Schubert et al., 1999; Barber and Odean, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 
2002; Beckmann & Menkhoff, 2008) above indicate that women tend to be more risk-averse 
than men. Based on this we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The change in riskiness of a corporation following CEO succession is a 
negative function of the change in CEO from male to female.  
 
We recognize the endogeneity of risk taking and CEO gender: While CEO gender may affect 
corporate risk taking, as hypothesized in hypothesis 2, it may also be true that firms with 
particular risk profiles are more inclined to choose specific genders of CEO and boards. An 
example is the “glass cliff” phenomenon raised by Ryan and Haslam, 2007. The “glass cliff” 
phenomenon states that females are overrepresented in precarious leadership positions. Similarly, 
there may be endogenous effects that make firms that choose female CEOs also more likely to 
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hire female dominated boards, as in hypothesis 1. Because such endogeneity can cause bias in 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, we employ two stage least squares regression (2SLS).   
 For stage 1 of hypotheses 1 and 2 we use the following instrumental variable to model the 
change in the percentage of women on the board: the percentage of female board members on 
Fortune 500 companies in the year of succession (using data from Catalyst surveys and Peterson 
and Philpot, 2007). This variable meets the requirements of instrumental variables in that it is 
related to the choice of CEO but not related to the error term.  In tables 2 and 3 we show the 
findings for the 2SLS regressions. We include dummy variables to represent the year of the CEO 
succession to capture the trend that firms increasingly choose female CEOs over the sample 
period.   
 
 Data sources and variable definitions 
We form our sample by searching Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database for CEO 
successions.  Execucomp contains data about top executives and their compensation for large, 
small and mid cap North American firms. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6020-6799), 
consistent with Alexander (2006) and others who find that corporate governance in financial 
institutions is very different than in non-financial firms. Between 1992 and 2005 we find 758 
CEO successions.  We use these firms’ proxy statements to obtain data such as the number of 
female directors on the board and whether the successor CEO is an insider or outsider.  We 
obtain financial statement information from Compustat. We exclude all successions where board 
membership does not change from before to after succession.  We do this to avoid having the 
measure of change in board gender composition act as simply a proxy for board stability.  This 
reduces our sample size to 679 CEO successions in 650 firms. 
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The dependent variable in Hypothesis 1 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if, through 
succession, the firm’s CEO changes from a male to a female, zero otherwise. We test it by 
estimating an equation with limited dependent variable regression due to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable (Maddala, 1983; Aldrich & Nelson, 1984).  In a separate regression, we look 
at situations where the CEO changes from female to male using a dependent variable set equal to 
1.    
The dependent variable in hypothesis 2 is the change in the risk profile of the firm from pre 
to post CEO succession.  We look at change in risk over three periods relative to the succession, 
which we can think of as occurring in year “0”.  The three periods we examine are year -1 to 
year +1; year -3 to year +3 and year -5 to year +5. All three periods produce similar results, 
although the year -1 to year +1 findings are somewhat less significant, perhaps because new 
CEOs do not have time to effectively implement their plans over this short horizon.  We present 
the year -3 to year +3 findings in the tables of this paper because this time period is attrition free.  
Due to attrition, the sample size significantly declines if we expand the time period to year -5 to 
year +5. We use changes in the following measures of corporate riskiness commonly found in 
the literature: financial leverage (as in Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Watts, 1982 and 
1992; and Nam et al., 2003), research and development expense as a percent of sales (as in Nam 
et al., 2003), and cash holdings as a percent of total assets (as in Guney et al., 2007) – this is 
actually a measure of risk aversion, so we expect the opposite sign.  We also use the degree of 
operating leverage as a measure of firm riskiness as well as the standard deviation of cash flows 
adjusted for sector average standard deviation (as in John et al., 2008). Consistent with Chan et 
al. (2001), only about 40% of firms report research and development expenditures, reducing our 
sample size for this measure.  The sample size is also reduced when we use the standard 
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deviation of cash flows measure of risk, but because our initial sample is large, we still obtain 
significant results when using these variables. 
The principal independent variables are as follows: the change in the percentage of females 
on the board of directors (hypothesis 1) and the change in the gender of the CEO (hypothesis 2). 
The change in the percentage of females on the Board is examined rather than just the number of 
females on the Board because CEO successions are often accompanied by substantial changes in 
the make-up of the Board as successor CEOs arrange to have members included on the Board 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). We exclude the female CEO when we count the number of 
female directors on the board following succession.  This is done to avoid inducing a relationship 
between the presence of a woman CEO and the percentage of women on the board. These data 
are obtained from proxy statements. 
To control for other factors which may influence the hypothesized relationships, we include 
the following control variables (as suggested by CEO succession theory) in each equation: 
 
i) Firm size: To control for possible size-related heteroscedasticity and because 
large and small firms may behave differently, we include a variable representing 
firm size.  We measure this variable as the natural logarithm of the aggregate of 
the firm’s total assets from years -3 to -1 relative to CEO succession. When the 
dependent variable is change in cash as a percentage of total assets, we use sales 
instead of total assets, due to possible multicollinearity. 
ii)  Profitability: As in Carter et al. (2003) we include return on assets (ROA) as a 
control variable in our regression equations. We create an industry adjusted ROA 
measure (Barber and Lyon, 1996) for each firm for years -3 to -1 relative to 
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succession.  We computed the industry adjusted ROA by subtracting the firm’s 
average industry ROA (using four digit SIC codes where possible and three digit 
SIC codes when there are not at least three other firms in the same four digit SIC 
code) from each individual firm’s ROA. We obtain data for this measure from 
Compustat.   
iii) Forced versus voluntary succession: To determine the type of succession, we 
examine Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) for 
the reasons for the successions. From the news stories, we classify forced 
successions as all CEO successions other than those arising from retirement, 
death, illness, or those involving the CEO’s departure for a better and more 
prestigious position in another firm. As in Parrino (1997), we consider retirements 
of CEOs before the age of 60 to be forced retirements.  We code the variable as a 
1 for forced turnover and 0 otherwise.    
iv) Designated heir: Some firms have formal succession plans (Behn et al. 2005; 
Shen and Cannella, 2003).  We use the approaches in Vancil (1987), Kesner and 
Sebora (1994), Zhang and Rajagopalan (2006) and Dalton and Kesner (1983) to 
determine if our sample firms have a succession plan. The existence of such plans 
obviously impacts CEO succession, so we include a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 when there is an heir apparent as defined in Shen and Cannella, zero 
otherwise.  
v) Inside versus outside successor: If the board hires a CEO from inside the  
firm, we classify this as an inside successor and code the dummy variable as 1 for 
this case. We code outsiders as a 0. Consistent with Naveen (2006) we consider 
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CEOs who have been with the firm less than one year to be outsiders.  However, 
to remove interim CEOs from the sample, we discard observations for CEOs with 
a tenure of 1.5 years or less in the CEO position. 
vi) Dummy variables representing the year of succession are included to capture the 
fact the percentage of women in top management positions has increased over 
time. For ease of presentation, we do not show their estimated coefficients in the 
tables. 
When testing the hypothesis concerning risk taking (hypothesis 2) we include two additional 
control variables as follows: 
vii) A variable “CEO horizon” to reflect the possibility (Dechow and Sloan, 1991) 
that CEOs with short expected careers due to imminent retirement may reduce 
R&D expenditures to improve near term earnings reports. We calculate this 
variable as 65 less the age of the new CEO, which we obtain from Execucomp.  
When the CEO is older than 65, we use zero for this variable. Sixty five is the 
usual retirement age for CEOs (Wright et al., 2007). 
viii) Change in CEO’s  “pay at risk” over the succession period: We measure pay at 
risk as the  proportion of bonuses, restricted stock grants and option grants 
(excluding reloads) to total compensation less bonuses, restricted stock and option 
grants, using data from Execucomp (Elsaid and Davidson, 2009). Firms use such 
incentive compensation to manage managerial risk taking and align the interests 
of managers and shareholders (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Ryan and Wiggins, 2002, 
Yermack, 1997; Yermack and Ofek, 2000). In our study of managerial risk taking, 
we thought it important to control for firms’ attempts to manage this variable.   
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-----Insert Table 1 About Here----- 
Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis.  We removed 
observations with minimum and/or maximum changes of 100%, as these likely involve outliers.  
The sample descriptive statistics confirm that women average less than 10% of CEO positions.  
They also show the strong influence of inside successors (mean = 74%) and designated heirs 
(mean = 50%) in CEO successions, and the relative rarity of forced successions (6% ). 
 
-----Insert Table 2 About Here----- 
Table 2 contains the 2SLS limited dependent variable regression estimates of the relation 
between a change in CEO gender and the change in the percentage of female directors on the 
board.  In the results the estimated coefficient of the change in percentage of female directors is 
significant regardless of whether the CEO changes from male to female or female to male.  The 
sign of the estimated coefficient is as predicted in hypothesis 1, that is, a change to a female CEO 
is associated with more female directors and a change to a male CEO is associated with fewer 
female directors. 
-----Insert Table 3 About Here----- 
Table 3 presents the 2SLS estimates of the relation between changes in various risk 
measures for the firm and a change to a female CEO.  In the results one variable is significant in 
80% of the ways in which risk is measured. That variable is the change from a male to a female 
CEO, as predicted in hypothesis 2. In all cases, the sign of the relation is as predicted, i.e., the 
change to a female CEO is accompanied by less risk. Most of the control variables are not 
significant, but profitability (measured as industry adjusted ROA) is significant for two measures 
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of risk (% Change in R&D Expense and Change in Cash Holdings) and firm size (measured as 
natural log of total assets) is significant for two measures of risk (% Change in R&D Expense 
and % Change Leverage). The White-Koenker statistics given in the last line of the Tables 2 and 
3 show that all of our regressions are free of heteroscedasticity (Baum et al., 2003).  
 
Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion 
 Regression analysis shows that gender-related variables (change in CEO gender, change 
in percentage of women on the Board) are important in determining the risk profiles of 
corporations (hypothesis 2) and the likelihood that women will be chosen as CEO (hypothesis 1) 
respectively. Of perhaps equal interest are the findings that very few of the other variables found 
significant in other CEO succession research are significant in our study, testifying to the 
importance of the gender-related variables (Matsa and Miller, 2011) in predicting the gender of 
the new CEO (hypothesis 1) and risk profile of the firm (hypothesis 2).  In particular, firm size, 
profitability (Barbar & Lyon, 1996; Carter et al., 2003) the presence of a designated heir (Behn 
et al., 2005; Shen and Cannella, 2003), whether the successor CEO was from inside or outside 
the firm (Naveen, 2006) and whether the outgoing CEO was forced to resign (Parrino, 1997) did 
not impact women as successor CEOs when female Board membership was taken into account in 
contrast to their significance in the studies mentioned.  The insignificance of other variables 
suggests that without women on the Board, other measures aimed at promoting women to the 
CEO position are not effective.  For example, despite observations such as Ibarra and Hansen’s 
(2009) that women are twice as likely as men to be appointed from outside the company our 
results suggest that without sufficient representation of women on the Board, even a policy of  
outside promotion is unlikely to result in more female CEOs 
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 In terms of gender and risk-taking  (examined in general in Sheaffer et al., 2011; 
Maxfield et al., 2010; Beckmann and Menkoff, 2008), the only factor analyzed in our study of 
risk taking by newly appointed female CEOs, that rivals gender for statistical significance is 
profitability (measured as industry adjusted ROA).  It is reasonable to expect that firms consider 
their degree of profitability when establishing the risk profile of the firm.  It is noteworthy that 
even pay-at-risk (bonuses, option grants, etc.) found significant in general studies of CEO 
succession (Yermack & Ofek, 2000; Ryan & Wiggins, 2002; Elsaid & Davidson, 2009) did not 
have a significant impact on risk-taking when the switch to a female CEO is taken into account. 
Our contribution has been to add gender variables to models of CEO succession and firm 
risk taking.  The statistical significance of these variables has implications for several groups:  
First, future researchers should consider gender when modelling CEO succession. Future 
researchers should focus on “how to break” the demographic similarity barrier in promotions, 
leadership appointments and compensation. On the other hand, the insignificance of the 
profitability measure in our results seems to refute the “glass cliff” phenomenon, since Ryan and 
Haslam (2007) primarily identify perilous positions as ones in which firm performance has been 
deteriorating. Adam et al. (2009) also suggest that there appears to be no “glass cliff” facing 
female CEOs in the US. Further research on this topic may be warranted.  
The paper’s practical implications are as follows: women who aspire to CEO status 
should monitor the gender composition of the Board of Directors of their firm or of firms where 
they are contemplating employment, as female representation on the Board is a significant 
determinant of female succession to the CEO position.  Firms wishing to promote women to top 
executive positions should likewise monitor Board composition to ensure significant female 
representation. Matsa and Miller (2011) argue that “public policies aimed at increasing female 
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representation on boards of directors, such as the quota recently adopted in Norway, may lead to 
general spillovers in management.” There is a feedback cycle effect in this case where the 
presence of more females CEOs increases the pool of potential female board members which in 
turn further increases the number of female CEOs. We show that other steps that firms may take 
to try to promote women (for example, recruiting from outside the firm) are unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO. 
Finally, the findings provide new insight into the direction successor female CEOs take 
their firms with respect to concrete measures of corporate risk taking (hypothesis 2).  The 
direction is toward lower levels of riskiness.  Corporate boards seeking cautious leadership 
would do well to consider female CEOs. This finding could be helpful in influencing public 
attitudes to be more accepting of female CEOs and more females in top management and boards 
of directors. 
 
Limitations 
 The sample is limited to North American firms.  Cultural differences may imply that the 
findings do not generalize to other regions.  Furthermore, the reliance on the Compustat database 
means that sample firms are all stock exchange-listed and therefore are more likely to be larger 
firms.  The findings may not generalize to small or privately held firms. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
N 
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variables: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Male-to-Female CEO Dummy 
 
 
679 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.073 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.260 
Female-to-Male CEO Dummy 679 0.000 0.022 1.000 0.000 0.146 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
% Change in R&D Expense  
 
309 
 
0.031 
 
0.075 
 
1.442 
 
-0.862 
 
0.327 
Change in Cash Holdings  659 0.003 0.015 0.976 -0.383 0.077 
% Change in Leverage  637 0.021 0.677 296.190 -0.982 11.906 
Change in Operating Leverage 556 -0.254 3.088 273.584 -252.418 46.733 
Std. Dev. Of Cash Flows 
Explanatory Variables: 
309 
 
0.023 0.599 43.566 0.001 4.787 
 
 
% Female Directors (t=+1) 661 0.083 0.088 0.75 0.000 0.102 
% Female Directors (t=-1) 661 0.063 0.076 0.60 0.000 0.096 
Change in  %  Female Directors 661 0.000 0.012 0.40 -0.33 0.059 
Forced Turnover 679 0.000 0.063 1.000 0.000 0.244 
Insider Successor 679 1.000 0.741 1.000 0.000 0.439 
Designated Heir 679 0.000 0.495 1.000 0.000 0.500 
Ind. Adj. ROA (t=-3to-1) 667 7.146 13.560 351.434 -226.800 29.390 
Ln Total Assets (t=-3to-1) 668 6.785 6.986 12.126 2.393 1.627 
Ln Sales (t=-3to-1) 671 6.969 6.966 11.53 1.43 1.571 
% Female Directorships in Fortune 
500 Firms 
665 10.200 9.926 14.700 8.300 0.990 
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Table 2: 2SLS Estimates for Hypothesis 1: Change in CEO gender from male to female is a positive 
function of the change in percentage of females on the board and vice versa. (t statistics in brackets) 
 
  Male-to-Female CEO   Female-to-Male CEO  
Constant 0.018 
(0.384) 
0.059 
(1.429) 
 
Change in  %  Female Directors 0.099 
(2.231)* 
-0.242 
(-6.149)*** 
 
Ind. Adj. ROA 0.0001 
(0.677) 
0.000 
(1.147) 
 
Ln Total Assets  -0.004 
(-1.730)† 
-0.010 
(-4.469)*** 
 
Designated Heir -0.009 
(-0.950) 
-0.003 
(-0.367) 
 
Insider Successor 0.016 
(1.491) 
-0.000 
(-0.028) 
 
Forced Turnover -0.012 
(-0.735) 
-0.021 
(-1.415) 
 
Adjusted R2 
(F) 
 
N 
 
White-Koenker 
0.2% 
(0.911) 
 
661 
 
15.208 
5.4% 
(3.790)*** 
 
661 
 
19.892 
 
*** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05, † Significant at 0.10 
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Table 3: 2SLS Estimates for Hypothesis 2: Change in risk is a negative function of change in CEO from 
male to female (t statistics in brackets) 
 
 % Change 
in R&D 
Expense 
 
Change in 
Cash 
Holdings 
 
% Change 
Leverage 
 
Change in 
operating 
leverage 
 
Std Deviation 
of Cash Flows 
 
Constant 17.355 
(1.105) 
-0.011 
(-0.346) 
5.703 
(1.686)† 
-2.923 
(-0.103) 
1.362 
(0.428) 
 
Male→ Female CEO -15.424 
(-2.123)* 
0.078 
(2.663)** 
-1.309 
(-0.238) 
-13.605 
(-1.747)† 
-9.727 
(-4.151)*** 
 
Ind. Adj. ROA 0.332 
(3.446)*** 
0.000 
(3.131)** 
-0.033 
(-1.518) 
0.121 
(1.318) 
0.005 
(0.470) 
 
Ln Total Assets  -3.201 
(-1.772)† 
-- -0.883 
(-2.375)* 
 
-0.542 
(-0.368) 
-0.126 
(-0.669) 
 
Ln Sales  -- 0.001 
(0.928) 
 
-- -- -- 
Designated Heir 7.683 
(0.985) 
0.003 
(0.474) 
1.155 
(0.783) 
-7.853 
(-1.326) 
-1.150 
(-1.589) 
 
Insider Successor -2.699 
(-0.302) 
0.002 
(0.301) 
-0.544 
(-0.311) 
0.581 
(0.086) 
1.133 
(1.284) 
 
Forced Turnover -4.754 
(-0.367) 
-0.011 
(-1.023) 
-0.166 
(-0.065) 
5.712 
(0.560) 
-0.289 
(-0.228) 
 
New CEO Horizon -0.170 
(-0.283) 
0.000 
(0.240) 
0.109 
(0.993) 
0.686 
(1.608) 
-0.006 
(-0.124) 
 
Change in Pay at Risk 0.015 
(0.030) 
-0.001 
(-1.106) 
-0.002 
(-0.014) 
-0.356 
(-0.819) 
-0.015 
(-0.306) 
 
Adjusted R2 
(F) 
 
N 
 
White-Koenker 
4.9% 
(2.414)* 
 
309 
 
12.698 
1.8% 
(1.613)† 
 
566 
 
13.804 
0.3% 
(1.186) 
 
566 
 
7.595 
1% 
(1.288) 
 
556 
 
16.869 
8.1% 
(2.416)** 
 
309 
 
15.016 
 
*** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05, † Significant at 0.10  
 19 
 
References 
 
Adams, S., Gupta, A. and Leeth, J. (2009). “Are female executives over-represented in 
precarious leadership positions?”, British Journal of Management, Vol. 20, pp. 1-12.  
 
Aldrich, J. and Nelson, F. (1984), Linear probability, logit, and probit models, Sage Publications, 
Newbury Park, CA. 
 
Alexander, K. (2006), “Corporate governance and banks: The role of regulation in reducing the 
principal-agent problem”, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 7, pp. 17-40. 
 
Atkinson, S., Baird, S. and Frye, M. (2003), “Do female mutual fund managers manage 
differently?”, Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 26, pp. 1-18. 
 
Bajtelsmit, V., Bernask, A. and Jiankoplos, N., (1999), “Gender differences in defined 
contribution pension decisions”, Financial Services Review, Vol. 8, pp. 1-10. 
 
Barber, B. and Odean, T. (2001), “Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence and common 
stock investment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 261-292. 
 
Barber, B. and Lyon, J. (1996), “Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical 
power and specification of test statistics”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 
359-399. 
 
Baum, C., Schaffer, M. and Stillman, S. (2003), “Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation 
and testing”, Stata Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 1-31. 
 
Beatty, R. and Zajac, E. (1994), “Managerial incentives, monitoring and risk bearing: A study of 
executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, pp. 313-335. 
 
Beckmann, D. and Menkoff, L. (2008), “Will women be women? Analyzing the gender 
difference among financial experts”, Kyklos, Vol. 61, pp. 364-384. 
 
Behn, B.K., Riley, R.A. and Yang, Y. (2005), “The value of an heir apparent in succession 
planning”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13, pp. 168-177. 
 
Bliss, R. and Potter, M. (2002), “Mutual fund managers: Does gender matter?”, Journal of 
Business and Economic Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 1-15. 
 
Brady, D., Isaacs, K., Reeves, M., Burroway, R. and Reynolds, M. (2011), “Sector, size, 
stability, and scandal: Explaining the presence of female executives in Fortune 500 
firms”, Gender in Management: An International Journal, Vol.26, pp. 84-104. 
 
 
 21 
Carter, D., Simkins, B. and Simpson, W. (2003), “Corporate governance, board diversity and 
firm value”, The Financial Review, Vol. 38, pp. 33-53. 
 
Chan, L., Lakonishok, J. and Sougiannis, T. (2001), “The stock market valuation of research and 
development expenditures”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, pp. 2431-2456. 
 
Dalton, D. and Kesner, I. (1983), “Inside/outside succession and organizational size: The 
pragmatics of executive replacement”, The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 26, 
pp. 736-742. 
 
Davidson,W., Ning, Y. Rakowski, D. and Elsaid, E. (2008), “The antecedents of simultaneous 
appointments to CEO and Chair”, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 12, pp. 
381-401. 
 
Dechow, P. and Sloan, R. (1991), “Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical 
investigation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 51-90. 
 
Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (2002), “Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes 
towards financial risk”, Evolution of Human Behaviour, Vol. 23, pp. 281-295. 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), “Managing Risk in Perilous Times: Practical Steps to 
Accelerate Recovery”, Mar. 23, p. 19. 
 
Elsaid, E. and Davidson, W. (2009), “What happens to CEO compensation following turnover 
and succession?”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 49, pp. 424-447. 
 
Goldberg, C. (2005), “Relational demography and similarity-attraction in interview assessments 
and subsequent offer decisions: Are we missing something?”, Group Organization 
Management, Vol. 30, pp. 597-624. 
 
Guney, Y., Ozcan, A. and Ozcan, N. (2007), “International evidence on the non-linear impact of 
leverage on corporate cash holdings”, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 
Vol. 17, pp. 45-60. 
 
Hansen, M., Ibarra, H. and Peyer, U., (2010), “The best-performing CEOs in the world”, 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 88, pp. 104-113. 
 
Harrison, D., Price, K. and Bell, M. (1998), “Beyond relational demography: Time and the 
effects of surface-and deep-level diversity on work group cohesion”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 96-107. 
 
Haugen, R. and Senbet, L. (1981), “Resolving the agency problems of external capital through 
options”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 36, pp. 629-647. 
 
 22 
Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. (2003), “Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: A survey of the economic literature”, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, pp. 7-
26. 
 
Ibarra, H. and Hansen, M., (2009), “Women CEOs: Why so few?”, 
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2009/12/women_ceo_why_so_few.html, (accessed 27 May, 2011). 
 
Iqbal, Z., O, S. and Baek, H. (2006), “Are female executives more risk-averse than male 
executives?”, Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 34, pp. 63-74. 
 
Jackson, S., Brett, J., Sessa, V., Cooper, D., Julin, J. and Peyronnin, K. (1991), “Some 
differences make a difference: Interpersonal dissimilarity and group heterogeneity as 
correlates of recruitment, promotion, and turnover”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 
76, pp. 675-689. 
 
John, K., Litov, L. and Yeung, B. (2008), “Corporate governance and risk-taking”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 63, pp. 1679-1728. 
 
Kesner, I. and Sebora, T. (1994), “Executive succession: Past, present and future”, Journal of 
Management, Vol. 20, pp. 327-372. 
 
Kleiman, H., (1992), “Lesson from yesterday: How we can recapture the technological lead”, 
Industry Week, Vol. 241, pp. 54. 
 
Maddala. G., (1983), Limited dependent and quantitative variables in economics, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY. 
  
Matsa, D. and Miller, A. (2011) “Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in 
Corporate Leadership”, American Economic Review, Vol. 101, pp. 635-639.  
 
Maxfield, S., Shapiro, M., Gupta, G. and Hass, S. (2010), “Gender and risk: Women, risk taking 
and risk aversion”, Gender in Management: An International Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 586-
602. 
 
Michinov, E. and Monteil, J. (2002), “The similarity-attraction relationship revisited: Divergence  
between the affective and behavioural facets of attraction”, European Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol. 32, pp. 485-500. 
 
Moreno, R. and Flowerday, T. (2006), “Students’ choice of animated pedagogical agents in  
science learning: A test of similarity-attraction hypothesis on gender and ethnicity”, 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, Vol. 31, pp. 186-207. 
 
Mortgenson, G. (2008), “Naked came the speculators”, The New York Times, Business; Column 
“Money and Business/Financial Desk”, 10 August, p. 1, available at: www.nytimes. 
com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html?_r¼1&scp¼166&sq¼Morgenson&st¼nyt 
(accessed 31 May 2011). 
 23 
 
Nam, J, Ottoo, R. and Thornton Jr., J. (2003), “The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk 
on corporate capital structure and R&D investment”, The Financial Review, Vol. 38, pp. 
77-101. 
 
Naveen, L. (2006), “Organizational complexity and succession planning”, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41, pp. 661-683. 
 
O’Leary, J. (1997), “Developing a new mindset: The ‘career ambitious individual’ ”, Women in 
Management Review, Vol. 12, pp. 91-99. 
 
Orser, B. and Leck, J., (2010), “Gender influences on career success outcomes”, Gender in 
Management: An International Journal, Vol.25, pp. 386-407. 
 
Parrino, R. (1997), “CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 165-197. 
 
Peterson, C. and Philpot, J. (2007), “Women’s roles on US Fortune 500 Boards: Director 
expertise and committee membership”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 72, pp. 177-196. 
 
Pfeffer, L. (1983), “Organizational demography”, in Cummings, L. and Staw, B. (Ed.), Research 
in Organizational Behavior, JAI press, Greenwich, CT, pp. 299-357. 
   
Polyhart, R., Weekley, J. and Baughman, K. (2006), “The structure and function of human 
capital emergence: A multilevel examination of the attraction-selection-attrition model’, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 49, pp. 661-677. 
 
Power, M. (2009), “The risk management of nothing”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Vol. 34, pp. 849-855. 
 
Ryan, H. and Wiggins, R. (2002), “The interactions between R&D investment decisions and 
compensation policy”, Financial Management, Vol. 31, pp. 5-29. 
 
Ryan, M. and Haslam, S. (2007), “The glass cliff: Exploring the dynamics surrounding the 
appointment of women to precarious leadership positions”, Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 32, pp. 549-572. 
 
Schneider, B. (1987), “The people make the place”, Personnel Psychology, Vol. 40, pp. 437-453. 
 
Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M. and Brachinger, H. (1999), “Financial decision making: Are 
women really more risk averse”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 381-385. 
 
Sheaffer, Z., Bogler, R., and Sarfaty, S., (2011), “Leadership attributes, masculinity and risk 
taking as predictors of crisis proneness”, Gender in Management: An International 
Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 163-187. 
 
 24 
Shen, W. and Cannella, A. (2003), “Will succession planning increase shareholder wealth? 
Evidence from investor reactions to relay CEO succession”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 191-198. 
 
Smith, C. and Watts, R. (1982), “Incentive and tax effects of U.S. executive compensation 
plans”, Australian Management Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 139-157. 
 
Smith, C. and Watts, R. (1992), “The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, 
dividend and compensation policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 263-
292. 
 
Smith, J.B. (1998), “Buyer-Seller relationships: Similarity, relationship management, and  
quality”, Psychology and Marketing, Vol. 15, pp. 3-21. 
 
Syed, M. (2008), “What caused the crunch? Sex in the city”, The Times London, 30 September,  
available at: http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_ 
live/article4848188.ece (accessed 31 May 2011). 
 
 
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1986), “The social identity of intergroup relations”, in Worchel, S. and 
Austion , G. (ed.), Nelson-Hall, Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago, IL. 
 
Tsui, A. and  O’Reilly, C. (1989), “Beyond simple demographic effects: The importance of 
relational demography in superior-subordinate dyads”, Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol.  32, pp. 402-423. 
 
Tucker, R., (2006), “Do you reward risk-taking?”, Leadership Excellence, Vol. 23, pp. 10. 
 
Vancil, R. (1987), “Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO Succession”, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston. 
 
Welsch, H. and Young, E. (1984), “Male and female entrepreneurial characteristics and 
behaviours: A profile of similarities and differences”, International Small Business 
Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 11-20. 
 
Worrell, D., Nemec, C. and Davidson, W. (1997), “One hat too many: Key executive plurality 
and shareholder wealth”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, pp. 499-507. 
 
Wright, P., Kroll, M., Krug, J. and Pettus, M. (2007), “Influences of top management team 
incentives on firm risk taking”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 81-89. 
 
Yermack, D. (1997), “Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news 
announcements”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 449-476. 
 
Yermack, D. and Ofek, E., (2000), “Taking stock: Equity-based compensation and the evolution 
of managerial ownership”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 1367-1384. 
 25 
 
Zajac, E. and Westphal, J. (1996), “Who shall succeed? How CEO/board preferences affect the 
choice of new CEOs”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 39, pp. 64-90. 
 
Zhang, Y. and Rajagopalan, N. (2006), “Grooming for the top post and ending the CEO 
succession crisis”, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 35, pp. 96-105. 
 
